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CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION: THE RESILIENCE OF 
THE AMERICAN MODEL 
 




I. The American Model 
 
Several characteristics of the American economic model influence American 
free speech law.  Perhaps most obvious is the model’s faith in the 
unregulated market to produce optimal results. In the context of free 
expression, this faith is reflected in the famous metaphor of ‘the marketplace 
of ideas’, according to which the largely unregulated competition of ideas in 
the public square yields truth, as better ideas gain adherents and triumph over 
less worthy ones. The marketplace metaphor – concentrating as it does on 
the general social benefits of speech, as opposed to the benefits accorded the 
speaker – favors protection of corporate speech as an additional competitor 
for the public’s ultimate approval in the latter’s search for truth. 
 
Interestingly, it bears noting, if only briefly, that the current Court appears 
poised to embrace corporate speech even under a more speaker-centered 
theory of free speech. At oral argument in Citizens United Chief Justice 
Roberts, among others, questioned the argument that corporations were 
single-mindedly devoted to profit-making. He suggested instead that such 
entities, motivated by their shareholders, might have opinions about a diverse 
array of topics and a desire to express views on them. While the Chief Justice 
stopped short of embracing the idea that corporations enjoy self-fulfillment 
from speaking, this slight movement toward anthropomorphising them 
would allow the Court to paint them as simply another participant in 
democratic debate, possessing all the motives other speakers possess, rather 
than as entities whose political speech is motivated by a single instrumental 
concern for profit maximisation. 
 
Return, though, to the marketplace theory of speech. In American campaign 
finance jurisprudence this unadulterated faith in expression – or rather, in 
citizens’ response to expression – is reflected in the Court’s growing 
skepticism about the argument that corporate political speech risks 
corrupting the political process by skewing debate. Most notably, Justice 
Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) 
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derided the idea that government had a legitimate interest in ensuring that 
speech occurred only in rough proportion to the popular support enjoyed by 
the ideas it conveyed, calling it, in a play on the equality principle of ‘one 
man, one vote’, an “illiberal free speech principle of ‘one man, one minute.’”   
 
It is perhaps on the topic of corporate speech’s potential to distort political 
discourse that the current Court’s evolution has been most remarkable. In 
1982, in Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee, the 
Court unanimously concluded that the economic advantages provided by the 
corporate form gave corporations unique power that justified special 
regulation of corporate campaign activities. Four years later, in Federal Election 
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) (1986), five members of 
the Court recognised these distortive effects but held that they did not justify 
regulation of a non-profit corporation that refused contributions from 
business corporations; the four dissenters would have allowed the 
government to regulate even those entities. Four years after MCFL, six 
Justices in Austin held that those distortive effects justified regulation of 
corporations’ speech endorsing or attacking candidates for office. The fact 
that, as of this writing, the Court is now on the edge of deregulating 
corporate political speech illustrates the extent of this turnabout and the 
Court’s skepticism about market distortion. 
 
Following from this faith in unlimited expression is deep skepticism about 
government attempts to regulate speech in the name of equality. In the 
general business context this skepticism is evident in the enthusiastic 
American embrace of market relationships and outcomes and corresponding 
suspicion of wealth-transfer programs. In the speech context, this same 
skepticism is evident in the Court’s emphatic and continuing rejection, as 
illegitimate, of a speech equalisation rationale for campaign finance 
regulation. This rejection is not a product of any evolution on the modern 
Court; at least since the seminal case of Buckley v. Valeo (1976) the Court has 
rejected the legitimacy of this justification for regulating political speech. 
 
Finally, in perhaps the clearest link between the American model of business 
regulation and free speech, the Court has shown increasing skepticism of 
rationales for regulation of corporate speech that turn on a desire to protect 
shareholders. The basic idea is that shareholders have their own free speech 
interests in remaining free from involuntarily subsidissing corporate speech 
by having corporations they invest in use their general treasury funds for 
speech. Justice White forcefully advocated this idea in his dissenting opinion 
in First National Bank v. Bellotti (1978), the case that established at least a 
general right of corporations to engage in some political speech. In 
subsequent years, a majority of the Court embraced Justice White’s principle 
in MCFL and Austin, discussed above.1 Since then, however, the idea has 
                                               
1 Because Bellotti dealt with a complete prohibition on corporate speech with regard to a 
referendum, the Court in MCFL and Austin was able to distinguish that case on the ground 
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come under significant attack. In the oral argument in Citizens United, Chief 
Justice Roberts and others expressed palpable skepticism about this 
shareholder-protection rationale, largely due to its paternalistic nature. One 
can discern a clear link between that skepticism and a more generalised 
rejection of government regulation of the market aimed at protecting 
shareholders and other participants. 
 
II. The Limits of the Model 
 
The limits of the American model of business regulation have become 
increasingly obvious over the last several years. Since this is a paper about 
expression and not business regulation these limits need not be examined in 
detail. However, as they relate to expression, suffice it to say that the current 
financial crisis has called into severe doubt Americans’ (and others’) faith that 
an unregulated market reliably generates optimal outcomes. Moreover, 
suspicion that the players at the apex of the financial pyramid will somehow 
survive the crisis far better than average stakeholders may generate more 
support for government regulation that seeks to protect such stakeholders. 
 
Neither of these dynamics directly translates into public opinion about 
restrictions on corporate political speech, let alone judicial opinion about the 
constitutionality of such restrictions. At the same time, however, one should 
not minimise the extent to which empirical facts about business operations 
may provide an overall backdrop to judicial determinations about the 
importance of governmental interests justifying such restrictions.  In the two 
seminal campaign finance cases, Buckley v. Valeo (1976) and McConnell v. 
Federal Election Commission (2003), the Court cited empirical facts about 
campaign finance abuses to justify upholding campaign finance regulations. 
Contemporary revelations about market manipulations and abuses of trust 
may well provide some counteracting force to the current Court’s libertarian 
push toward broader political speech rights for corporations. 
 
Still, despite the current economic crisis, characteristics more closely 
associated with American law and society may continue to keep its free 
expression law closely aligned with the more libertarian approach. Perhaps 
most fundamentally, the individualistic nature of Americans’ self-perception 
keeps American free speech law from trending toward the more regulation-
accepting, communitarian approach taken by many other western 
democracies.  This characteristic arguably affects American free speech law 
on issues as disparate as the protected status of group libel or racial or 
religious ‘hate speech’ and regulation of the mass media, as well as the 
acceptability of a speech equalisation rationale for restrictions on corporate 
political speech. It should not be surprising, then, that American law on all of 
these free speech issues varies considerably from the law of other advanced 
democracies. 
                                                                                                                              
that the latter cases considered limitations, but not prohibitions, on corporate speech in the 
context of candidate elections, not referendum campaigns. 
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The nature and history of authoritative sources of American speech law also 
feed the American skepticism about such restrictions. Most notably, the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is framed as an absolute prohibition on 
speech restrictions. The practical necessity for some speech restrictions has 
always contradicted the idea that the First Amendment’s command that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech” in fact 
enshrines an absolute rule. Still, courts interpreting that command in light of 
practical realities have attempted to maintain the purity of that command by 
simply excising, as a matter of original meaning, some expression (for 
example, obscenity) from “the freedom of speech” protected by the First 
Amendment. When that tack has proved impossible, courts have insisted that 
speech restrictions either be content-neutral or narrowly tailored to meet a 
compelling government interest; both of these formulas aspire to avoid 
explicit balancing of speech and other goals, in the hope of maintaining the 
purity of the Constitution’s command. This imperative has also led, perhaps 
less convincingly, to attempts to define some expression as simply not 
speech, despite its obvious expressive quality. 
 
These moves, whatever their justification in constitutional history or logic, 
reveal a fundamental difference between American free expression law and 
the free expression law of other western democracies. The absolutist nature 
of the First Amendment, both as drafted and as interpreted by American 
courts, stands in stark contrast to the proportionality and interest-weighing 
explicitly embraced by a wide variety of other advanced western 
constitutional regimes. More fundamentally, the more hospitable reception 
other nations have accorded to government intrusion into private lives in the 
service of communal well-being contrasts with the generally more libertarian 
American approach. 
 
Perhaps equally important in understanding this phenomenon is the absence, 
in American history, of a significant internal threat to democracy. This happy 
incident of the American story may play a role in the faith its law and people 
possess in the benign power of speech and, conversely, their unwillingness to 
accept governmental intrusion for the sake of protecting democracy. The 
differing reactions to Nazi speech in the United States and postwar Germany 
present only the starkest example of the power of a nation’s history to spark 
different levels of appreciation for the dark, as well as the benign, potential 
of speech. 
 
Flowing from the American faith in unregulated speech is faith in listeners’ 
ability to sift truth from falsity. Justice Scalia’s derisive characterisation of the 
majority in Austin as embracing the idea that “too much speech is an evil that 
the democratic majority can proscribe” can only be understood as an 
endorsement of the idea that listeners have the capacity to accept or reject 
ideas based on their intrinsic merits, and not on how frequently or cleverly 
those ideas are presented. This faith has consequences. Justice Scalia’s view 
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does not necessarily imply rejection of a political equality justification for 
limits on political speech. However, it is only a relatively short progression to 
that further step: if the electorate is capable of accurately evaluating a 
political message regardless of how often it is repeated in the media, then 
nobody is denied an equal opportunity to participate in the political process 
simply because someone else can speak more. Conversely, however, if 
political outcomes can be distorted by inequalities in speech opportunities, 
then the right to equal participation in politics would seem to require, or at 
least benefit from, government action to ensure equality in political speech. 
 
The assumptions underlying the American approach to these issues contrast 
starkly with those of other nations, whose restrictions on political speech are 
based on equality concerns.  For example, British law’s restrictions on 
purchasing broadcast time to communicate political messages reflect concern 
about the skewing of political debate allegedly caused by unequal quantities 
of speech. Indeed, sometimes a concern for equality can lead to unequal 
distribution of communications resources. In Canada, for example, the 
election law grants parties free broadcast time during election periods, 
allocated based in large part on their existing political strength, and restricts 
purchase of additional time outside of that framework. This system, of 
course, leads to massive disparities in the amount of broadcast time available 
to the various parties. However instantiated, any such system of allocations 
and restrictions necessarily supposes that, in Justice Scalia’s words, “too 
much speech is an evil that the democratic majority can proscribe,” or, 
perhaps more to the current point, that relative allocations of speech are 
more important to an informed electorate than absolute amounts. 
 
Are restrictions on corporate political speech acceptable?  The answer turns 
largely on one’s position on the ‘absolute-amount-versus-relative-allocation’ 
issue set forth in the last paragraph, with perhaps some additional 
consideration for one’s view about the workability and fairness of any official 
system of speech restrictions and allocations. If one believes that political 
speech in itself is a good thing, regardless of its source and its relative 
allocation, then one should not be concerned if speech comes in unequal 
amounts from proponents of different views. Moreover, one would not be 
concerned if that speech came from non-members of the polity, such as 
foreigners and non-natural entities such as corporations.  Simply put, if the 
value lies in the speech itself, then its origins should be irrelevant.   
 
On the other hand, if speech is valuable because it reflects, in rough 
proportions, the pre-existing – and thus, presumably, undistorted – views of 
the electorate, then one should be concerned about both allocating speech in 
rough proportion to the political support it enjoys and ensuring that it 
emanates from members of the polity. For example, the Canadian 
government has defended its practice of allocating broadcast time among its 
parties in proportion to their electoral popularity on the ground that it is 
important for such allocations to favor broad-based national parties that have 
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a reasonable chance of winning the election and forming the government. 
Similarly, if one is concerned that repetition of speech has the effect of 
drowning out other voices, then restrictions may be appropriate in the 
service of preventing the skewing of debate, and hence outcomes. 
 
III. Prospects for the Future 
 
While it is always hazardous to predict the outcome of court cases, the oral 
argument in Citizens United suggests that an emerging majority of 
conservative justices will continue to put pressure on the current regime of 
limited toleration of limits on corporate political speech.  This development 
means that American free speech law will remain at odds with that of its 
advanced democratic counterparts around the world. This divergence is 
probably of no great concern to many members of the Court, given their 
suspicion of borrowing from abroad when interpreting American 
constitutional law.  
 
Perhaps more significant, then, is the potential contradiction within American 
law, between increased public acceptance of stringent government regulation 
of business’s general operations, and the Court’s push in the opposite 
direction with regard to the political speech engaged in by those same 
entities. Of course it must never be forgotten that, at least under one 
understanding, the U.S. Constitution draws a sharp distinction between 
regulation of businesses and regulation of the speech in which businesses 
engage. Most notably, while the Constitution imposes few limits on 
government regulation of commercial activity it severely limits government 
regulation of speech proposing that activity.2 There is certainly no doctrinal 
inconsistency between tolerating government regulation of the economic 




Regulation of business and regulation of the speech in which businesses 
engage raise some similar issues, such as the quality of the policy results 
produced by an unregulated regime and the ability of smaller stakeholders to 
protect their own interests (economic or speech) when large institutions so 
dominate the landscape. Changing perceptions of the correct answers to 
these questions in the context of general economic regulation may well 
                                               
2 See, for example, Justice Thomas’s remark in his dissenting opinion in Glickman v. 
Wileman Brothers and Elliott (1997): “Although the Constitution may not ‘enact Mr. 
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,’ and thus the Government has a considerable range of 
authority in regulating the Nation's economic structure, part of the Constitution – the First 
Amendment – does enact a distinctly individualistic notion of the freedom of speech, and 
Congress may not simply collectivise that aspect of our society, regardless of what it may 
do elsewhere.” The reference to Herbert Spencer, and the internal quotation, are both from 
Justice Holmes’s classic dissent in Lochner v. New York (1905), where Holmes dissented 
from the Court’s second-guessing of a law mandating a maximum 60-hour work week for 
bakers.  
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influence perceptions of those answers in the context of speech regulation. 
Thus, it remains unclear whether Americans will continue to accept the 
discrepancy between the constitutional status of corporate economic 
regulation and corporate speech regulation. Should they come to question 
the emerging laissez-faire approach to corporate speech they may find lessons 
in how other advanced democracies approach the issue, now that the 
American model has revealed its weaknesses.  
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